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TESTIMONY OF INFORMERS
hand, did not so limit the circumstances of admission. The usefulness
of polygraph evidence on the Zeiger facts is not so apparent, and the
evidence should have been excluded. However, the usefulness of the
evidence in the narrow circumstances under which Ridling and A v. B
allowed admissibility is apparent. The experience gained from such
admissions may then be used to guide the courts in determining whether
the admissions door should be opened wider.
L. JAMES BLACKWOOD
Evidence-Testimony of Government Informers in Narcotics Cases
The practice of using informers in an effort to apprehend narcotics
peddlers and as a source of information is openly admitted by prosecu-
tors and police officials.' This standard technique is considered "essen-
tial" in combating the drug traffic since there are no complaining wit-
nesses or victims-only willing sellers and willing buyers-a fact that
forces law enforcement officers to "initiate cases" to combat the drug
trade.2 It has been estimated that almost ninety-five percent of all fed-
eral narcotics convictions are obtained as the result of the work of
informers3 and that any government success in penetrating large selling
organizations has been possible only through the use of informers and
undercover agents.4
In order for the government to infiltrate the illicit drug traffic, it
must use leverage to obtain the cooperation of reluctant participants in
the traffic.' An informant usually is a person who is facing criminal
charges and who is induced into cooperating with the government in
order to receive a "break" in the criminal process.' If an informant is
'A. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 36 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LINDESMITH]; U.S.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 8 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
2TASK FORCE REPORT 8.
'Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28
FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 403 (1959).
Ild.; LINDESMITH 43. The Bureau of Narcotics operates on the premise that the more "buys"
set up and the more violators enlisted as informers, the deeper the government will penetrate into




'TASK FORCE REPORT 8. The "break" given informants is usually a reduction in charges.
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not facing criminal charges, his motivation for supplying information
may arise out of revenge or monetary reward. 7
Because drug addicts are considered crime-prone' and are directly
involved in the drug trade, they make up a large percentage of the
government's informers.' Although drug addiction itself is not a crime,,"
the addict cannot maintain his habit without violating some criminal
laws against purchase and possession of narcotics. Thus the addict is in
perpetual violation of one or several criminal laws," and the government
has enormous leverage in securing his cooperation through the threat
of heavy mandatory penalties.12 Additionally, arrests of addicts, whether
based on legitimate charges or for harassment purposes, 3 provide the
government with an extremely persuasive means of "inducing" coopera-
tion by bribing the addict with drugs" or forcing the beginnings of
withdrawal symptoms.15
A danger arises, however, in the fact that the addict-turned-
informer is useless unless he provides meaningful tips or arranges sales
that lead to prosecution. Therefore, an informer whose primary interest
is in obtaining drugs to support his habit and avoiding punishment
might commit perjury, "frame" another addict, or make a false identifi-
cation to make a case. 6 Since the informer is usually motivated by his
own self-interest, the problem is further complicated when the govern-
ment prosecutor relies heavily on the testimony of'such an informer.
The credibility of the informer is questionable, and the need for protect-
ing the defendant's rights through impeachment and jury instructions as
to the informer's credibility raises several difficult questions: to what
extent should the court allow the defense to impeach the credibility of
the informer, when should cautionary instructions be given about the
informer's credibility, and what should be included in such instructions?
The answer to these questions must recognize the government's need to
use informers effectively in narcotics cases and the defendant's right to
be protected against fabricated charges and entrapment.
7Id.
'Id. at 10.
'E.g., LINDESMITH 35-36; TASK FORCE REPORT 8.
'*Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"TASK FORCE REPORT 10.
'2LINDESMITH 35.
"Id. at 36-38.
'T. DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY 194-95 (1970).
1"1d.; LINDESMITH 38.
"LINDESMITH 50; Comment, 2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB., supra note 4, at 48-49.
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The Supreme Court in On Lee v. United States17 recognized that
the government's use of informers may give rise to serious questions of
credibility entitling a defendant "to broad latitude to probe credibility
by cross-examination and to have the issues submitted to the jury with
careful instructions." 8 In a recent federal decision, United States v.
Kinnard,9 the approach put forth in On Lee was further examined by
the District of Columbia Circuit as to paid addict informers.
In Kinnard two defendants, Kinnard and Payne, were convicted for
possession and sale of heroin and failure to pay tax through the efforts
of a government informer who had arranged a sale between government
agents and the defendants."0 The informer admitted that he was a nar-
cotics user and that prior to the time he-became an informer he was in
custody in the District of Columbia charged with four counts of posses-
sion of narcotics, sale of narcotics, and burglary. After he became an
informer, the charges were reduced to two misdemeanors to which the
informer pleaded guilty and received two years probation. The informer
also received at least two hundred dollars, and his family was relocated
at the government's expense.
After his release, the informer arranged a sale with the defendant
Payne for the benefit of the informer's friend, who in reality was a
narcotics agent. There was no evidence as to the nature of the negotia-
tions between the informer and Payne except the informer's account,
which indicated that Payne was a willing seller.2' The actual sale tran-
spired at a parking lot in which Payne, the informer, and his "friend"
met with Payne's source, Kinnard, who brought the heroin and consum-
mated the sale. This transaction was witnessed by the undercover agent
acting as the informer's friend and another agent who observed from a
distance and identified the two defendants. 2
Although neither defendant testified in his own behalf, they both
raised the defense of entrapment by impeachment of the government's
informer on cross-examination. 23 The trial judge precluded cross-
examination of a narcotics agent as to the general reliability of addicts
and refused to give any special instructions on the unreliability of ad-
"343 U.S. 747 (1952).
Isd. at 757 (dictum).
1"465 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
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dicts. Defense counsel then sought to impeach the credibility of the
informer, who denied being an addict, by examining the needle marks
on the informer's arms and by introducing extrinsic evidence to prove
the frequency of his drug use. Since the informer admitted being a user,
the trial judge denied a request for a dermatology examination as raising
collateral issues.
Although each judge wrote his own opinion, the majority of the
court agreed that the trial judge erred in denying defense counsel the
opportunity to develop extrinsic evidence as to whether the government
informer was an addict. 4 The majority reasoned that although extrinsic
evidence ordinarily may not be used to impeach a witness's general
credibility or his specific testimony on a collateral matter, when the
government relies on the testimony of a paid informer about whom
there is suspicion of narcotic addiction, the evidence is probative of a
special motive to lie or fabricate a case against the defendant" and is
therefore admissible.2 1
Judge Bazelon in his concurring opinion argued that the defendants
should automatically be entitled to a special cautionary instruction as
to the unreliability of addict informers once the informer's status as an
addict is establishedY He would not require that a request for special
instruction be made by counsel but would make it mandatory for the
court to submit such instructions to counsel as a routine set of instruc-
tions once the status of the informer is established.28 Since the cross-
examination that might have established status was erroneously ex-
cluded, the majority assumed for purposes of appeal that the informer
was an addict. In Judge Bazelon's view, the trial court's failure to
provide the special instructions constituted error." Judge Leventhal on
the other hand would not find the defendants entitled to special instruc-
tions even if addict status were established unless counsel made a re-
quest for such instructions and the informer's testimony was not corro-
borated in any material aspect." Although the special cautionary in-
structions had not been requested by counsel in accordance with Rule
2 4
1d.
21Id. at 574 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), 579-80 (Leventhal, J., concurring).







30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 31 the majority of the
court recognized that the trial judge as a practical matter had foreclosed
a request from defense counsel by announcing his intention to refuse to
give such instructions during the trial in anticipation of counsel's later
request.3 1
The court held that the trial judge's failure to give the cautionary
instruction did not constitute reversible error unless it worked a "sub-
stantial prejudice" on the defendants.3 3 Judge Bazelon applied the
following test: "Failure to give the instruction is prejudicial when the
addict-informer's testimony contributes a material aspect of the prose-
cution's case, and it is not fully corroborated by other witnesses." 4
Under this test, the majority found that there was sufficient corrobora-
tion of the informer's testimony as to Kinnard's involvement for the jury
to have found he was not induced but was predisposed to commit the
crimes.3 5 The majority also found that the only evidence that Payne was
a willing seller was the informant's account of his negotiations with
Payne to make the sale. Since it took several attempts to get Payne to
make the sale, the court concluded that Payne could have been induced
against his will and therefore failure to give the cautionary instruction
was prejudicial error calling for reversal of Payne's conviction and a new
trial.3
8
Judge Adams, dissenting, would have affirmed Payne's conviction
as well. Despite the limitations on cross-examination, the dissent felt
that defense counsel had developed a considerable amount of evidence
to impeach the informant's credibility and that the trial judge did not
"1Rule 30 provides that any party may file a written request for court instructions to the jury
at the end of the evidence or as the court reasonably directs. The requests must be written and no
party may assign as error "any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objection." FED. R. CRIM. P. 30.
3465 F.2d at 567-69. The dissent rejected the argument that a request in accordance with
Rule 30 for a cautionary instruction would have been futile because of defense counsel's statement
that he was not requesting an instruction on addicts or their reliability. Assuming that the issue of
adequacy of instructions was properly preserved for appeal, the dissent felt the addict-informer
instruction was properly withheld because it had not been established that the informer was an
addict. Id. at 583 (Adams, J., dissenting).
1Id. at 575 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
31Id. The only difference in Judge Leventhal's test for determining reversible error appears
to be one of semantics. Judge Bazelon determines if there is error and then if it is reversible error
while Judge Leventhal just determines if there is reversible error leaving out the intermediate step.
'Md. at 577 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
"Id. at 576-77 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), 580 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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abuse his discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination since it did
not harm the defendants' casesY.3 The defense counsel's inquiry regard-
ing the informant's needle marks was excludable as collateral, 3 accord-
ing to the dissent, because it tended to show only that he lied about the
frequency of his use of narcotics and did not go "directly to defendants'
commission of the prescribed acts, their willingness to commit such acts,
or to the informer's credibility . . . ."" Had the trial judge allowed
the defense to bring in an expert to interpret the needle marks on the
informer's arms, the dissent felt that the prosecutor would have brought
in an expert to give a different interpretation. Such "a trial-within-a-
trial [is] the very result the collateral impeachment rule is designed to
prevent ... "40
Both concurring opinions that made up the majority were based on
judicial opinions that supported the necessity of a cautionary instruction
when paid government informers testify in criminal cases.4" Both opin-
ions relied on an earlier District of Columbia Circuit decision, Fletcher
v. United States," in which the court recognized that paid informers
have a self-interest motive to lie that creates the need for a special
cautionary instruction on their credibility in order to protect the defen-
dant's rights. The Fletcher court reversed the defendant's conviction
that had been based on the uncorroborated testimony of a paid govern-
ment informer who was also an addict and a narcotics peddler who had
previously been convicted and sentenced for violating the narcotics laws.
The court held that the trial judge's refusal to grant defendant's request
for a special cautionary instruction as to the testimony of a paid in-
former was a prejudicial error:
[W]here the entire case depends upon [a paid informer's] testimony,
the jury should be instructed to scrutinize it closely for the purpose of
determining whether it is colored in such a way as to place guilt upon
a defendant in furtherance of the witness's own interest. Here, admit-
tedly, the usefulness of the witness-and for which he received pay-
Mid. at 581-82.
l'The general rules of evidence prohibit extrinsic evidence to contradict a witness on collateral
matters. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 47, at 98 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK]; 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1001 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].
11465 F.2d at 582.
4d.
"Id. at 570 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), 577 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
4Z158 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
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ment from the agent-depended wholly upon his ability to make out
a case. No other motive than his own advantage impelled him in all
that he did. 3
The Fletcher court further noted the fact that the informer was an
addict and stated that it was a "well recognized fact that a drug addict
is inherently a perjurer where his own interests are concerned . . .-.
Considering that the informer was both an addict and paid by the gov-
ernment, the court held that the defendant's rights could only be pro-
tected by either corroboration of the informer's testimony or a special
cautionary instruction to the effect that the testimony should be "re-
ceived with suspicion" and "acted upon with caution."45 Although the
District of Columbia Circuit later interpreted Fletcher as applying to
paid informers generally whether or not they are addicts,46 one circuit
appears to have limited Fletcher to its facts. 7
Other federal circuits have followed the basic principles set forth
in Fletcher," which were similarly expressed by the later Supreme Court
decision, On Lee v. United States,49 and have applied them to informers
whose testimony may have been influenced by various sources of bias
such as narcotics addiction" or use, 51 being paid," subjection to pending
criminal charges, 53 and numerous combinations of these sources of





"6Godfrey v. United States, 353 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
"See United States v. Green, 327 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1964).
"SSee, e.g., Orebo v. United States, 293 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1961); Joseph v. United States,
286 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. Masino, 275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960).
49343 U.S. 747 (1952). Although On Lee dealt with a "wired for sound" informer who did
not testify at the trial of defendant, the dictum noted in the text accompanying note 18 supra has
provided courts with guiding principles by which to deal with the testimony of any government
informer.
' See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 447 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1971); Young v. United States,
297 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1962).
"1See, e.g., Todd v. United States, 345 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1965) (informer also had been
convicted of armed robbery, escaped from prison and associated with men of lewd character).
"See, e.g., Sartain v. United States, 303 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1962); Orebo v. United States,
293 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1961).
"See, e.g., United States v. Green, 327 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1964) (unindicted co-conspirator);
United States v. Masino, 275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960) (issue raised as to informer's use of narcot-
ics). All cases in which an accomplice testifies for the government as an informer would fall within
this area.
"See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 382 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1967) (paid and addict); Hardy v.
United States, 343 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965) (paid
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informer's testimony is corroborated or not,5 some decisions have div-
ided on the issue of whether or not a request for a cautionary instruction
must be properly submitted by counsel and refused by the trial judge
before there are grounds for reversal." In United States v. Griffin57 the
Sixth Circuit held that a cautionary instruction was mandatory when the
testimony of a paid government informer, who was also a narcotics
addict, was crucial and uncorroborated even though the defense failed
to make a request for the special instruction. Although the District of
Columbia Circuit has held in a case involving a paid-addict-informer
that a cautionary instruction must be given when requested unless there
is corroboration of the informant's testimony, 58 it has urged trial courts
to caution the jury about the unreliability of informant testimony even
in absence of a request.59 In Kinnard Judge Bazelon indicated that the
better rule in the case of an addict informer would be to have the court
give the cautionary instruction on its own motion." This view provided
the major difference between the concurring opinions in Kinnard, for
Judge Leventhal followed the view that only upon a proper request
should a special cautionary instruction be available." Since the United
States Supreme Court has held that the conviction of a defendant based
solely on the testimony of a government informer would be allowed to
stand even in absence of substantial corroboration," a mandatory cau-
tionary instruction would add a condition on the use of government
and addict); Joseph v. United States, 286 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1960) (paid and serving a prison term
for narcotics violations).
'See. e.g., Todd v. United States, 345 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1965); Hardy v. United States, 343
F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965). The concern over
corroboration of the informer's testimony stems in many cases from the possibility of the defendant
being forced or entrapped into committing a crime. Where the government merely affords oppor-
tunities or facilities for the commission of an offense, it does not defeat the prosecution; however,
when the criminal design originates not with the accused, but is conceived in the mind of govern.
ment officials and the accused is, by persuasion, deceitful representation or inducement, lured into
commission of the criminal act, the government is precluded from prosecuting. See Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See also Williams, supra note 3.
51See, e.g., Young v. United States, 297 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1962); Joseph v. United States,
286 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1960).
57382 F.2d 823, 829 (6th Cir. 1967).
"Hardy v. United States, 343 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
984 (1965).
5 'Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
1465 F.2d at 569, 572.
6'Id. at 577.




informers that the Supreme Court has not required. The dictum in On
Lee acknowledges only that the defendant is "entitled" to have the issue
of the informant's credibility submitted to the jury, not that it "must"
be submitted automatically without request. 3
Although most federal cases in this area have not been faced with
the issues involving the scope of impeachment on cross-examination of
an informant that were raised in Kinnard, such problems were examined
in United States v. Masino."1 In that case the defendant's conviction was
based almost entirely upon the uncorroborated testimony of a paid
informer and the defendant's accomplice. The defendant contended on
appeal that the trial court erred in restricting cross-examination of the
two witnesses, in admitting improper rebuttal testimony, and in refusing
to give a cautionary instruction to the jury."
The informer admitted that he was a former addict on cross-
examination but claimed that he was no longer a user. The defense
sought to show that the informer was still a user, that the informer was
arrested and charged with possession of a syringe and hypodermic nee-
dle, and that the charges against the informer were subsequently
dropped on request of the prosecutor. However, the trial judge excluded
both the proffered evidence of the charge and its subsequent disposition.
The appellate court held that the trial judge committed substantial error
in restricting cross-examination of the informer since the testimony
sought was highly relevant to the informer's motives for testifying as a
government witness.6 As in Kinnard, the court in Masino recognized
that cross-examination that is directed at revealing bias or interest on
the part of the witness is proper and that the widest possible latitude
should be allowed in cross-examination where a witness is being ques-
tioned as to possible motives for testifying falsely.67 The Masino court
also found substantial error in the trial judge's failure to give a requested
cautionary instruction as to the credibility of the informer and the ac-
complice since the government's case depended almost entirely upon the
testimony of the two witnesses and was uncorroborated 6
In both Masino and Kinnard the trial judges felt that cross-
examination of the informant as to his addiction and use of narcotics
"See text accompanying note 18, supra.
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was collateral to the issues in the case. A court's fear of undue delay
and a trial-within-a-trial on collateral issues is a very legitimate concern,
as the dissent in Kinnard noted." However, by the classical approach
to determining what is collateral, the appellate court reversals in both
cases were correct. Whether the defense counsel's theory of impeach-
ment is based on impeachment by contradiction, as the dissent in
Kinnard indicated,'" or by prior inconsistent statements, the test for
collateralness provides that facts which are independently provable by
extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness are not "collateral."', One type
of facts which meet this test are those which show bias or self-interest.,
Courts have long recognized that facts introduced to impeach cred-
ibility by showing bias are admissible and provable by extrinsic evi-
dence, 3 but have divided as to the foundation required before extrinsic
evidence can be introduced to show bias. The majority approach re-
quires that before a witness can be impeached by calling other witnesses
to prove acts or declarations showing bias, the witness under attack
must first be asked about these facts on cross-examination.74 A minority
of courts does not impose this requirement. The reason for the major-
ity approach is often said to be based on fairness to the witness, for he
might be able to explain the facts without extrinsic evidence., However,
the most logical reason is the time saved by making extrinsic evidence
unnecessary if the witness adequately explains the acts or declarations.'7
It is acknowledged, however, that when the main circumstances from
which the bias proceeds have been proved, the trial judge has discretion
to determine how far the details, whether on cross-examination or by
other witnesses, may be allowed to be brought out.7"
The dissent in Kinnard recognized this discretion in the trial judge
and argued that enough evidence had been introduced on cross-
examination of the informant to have impeached the informant's credi-
bility and that any further questions into the area would have been
"1465 F.2d at 582.
70 d.
"MCCORMICK § 36, at 70-71, § 47, at 98 & n.49; WIMORE §§ 1003, 1020.
72
MCCORMICK § 36, at 71, § 47, at 99; WIGMORE §§ 1005, 1022.
"MCCORMICK § 40, at 78; WIGMORE § 948.
"MCCORMICK § 40, at 80; WIGMORE §§ 953, 1025-28. I
"MCCORMICK § 40, at 80; WIGMORE §§ 953, 1025-28.
"MCCORMICK § 40, at 80; WIGMORE §§ 953, 1025-28.
7MCCORMICK § 40, at 80; WIGMORE §§ 953, 1025-28.
"MCCORMICK § 40, at 81; WiGMORE § 951.
920 [Vol. 51
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merely cumulative. However, the numerous sources of bias brought out
on cross-examination of the informant-prior drug use, being paid, and
pending criminal charges 79-would not justify limiting cross-
examination as to the informant's addiction. Each source of bias is
different, and to say that establishing the informer's addiction after his
admitting prior use of drugs would be merely cumulative completely
ignores the major difference between an addict, who must have drugs
to exist,8" and a user who may exist without them. A number of courts,
in emphasizing the need for a cautionary instruction, have noted that
an addict (not merely a user) is an inherent perjurer when it comes to
his own interest.81
Although it may be argued that court rules should not tamper
unduly with the system of using informers to combat today's drug prob-
lems for fear of sacrificing the security of society, the serious unreliabil-
ity problems which government informers create require that the bal-
ance be struck in favor of protecting the rights and liberties of the
defendant. In order to protect the rights of the defendant, the courts
should allow a wide latitude on cross-examination of the informer in the
area of impeachment by bias. The more facts brought out relating to
different sources of bias, the greater the informant's motive to fabricate
or lie and therefore the defendant should be allowed increasing flexibil-
ity to reveal these facts to the jury.
The fact that an informant is paid or is subject to pending criminal
charges provides motive to fabricate or lie, but the fact that the inform-
ant is an addict creates a far greater motive to fabricate or lie because
his habit, of necessity, requires that he remain free and out of jail.
Rarely would an addict not be subject to pending criminal charges when
he is induced into providing his services, so this double factor provides
an awesome threat to the rights of a defendant to a fair trial. The
mandatory cautionary instruction requirement advocated by Judge Ba-
zelon would provide the best means of protecting the defendant's rights.
As pointed out by Judge Bazelon,82 the cautionary instructions should
be mandatory in the sense that the trial judge would automatically
"1465 F.2d at 581-82. Informer also lied at an identification hearing, sold drugs and had a prior
conviction for robbery.
4rASK FORCE REPORT 10.
"1E.g., United States v. Griffin, 382 F.2d 823, 828 (6th Cir. 1967); Fletcher v. United States,
158 F.2d 321, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
81465 F.2d at 572-73.
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submit such instructions to the defense counsel as a part of the trial
court's routine set of instructions, and at this point the defendant could
object to the instructions if they in any way prejudiced his defense. 3 A
mandatory cautionary instruction rule would be easy for the trial judge
to apply because the question of adequacy of corroboration would not
be an issue he would have to resolve in determining whether to give the
special instructions upon a request from defense counsel. In additibn,
as also pointed out by Judge Bazelon, 4 the problem of court-appointed
attorneys who may not specialize in criminal cases and are not familiar
with criminal rules of procedure would not work to the defendant's
disadvantage if there was a failure to request special instructions in
accordance with procedural rules. s5
Under Judge Bazelon's approach, special instructions would be-
come mandatory once the addiction status of a paid informer under
pending criminal charges was established. However, regardless of
whether an informer is an addict or not, the fact that the informer is
either paid or under pending criminal charges should be sufficient to
activate the mandatory cautionary instruction rule since there is suffi-
cient motive to fabricate or lie without combination of all these sources
of bias. The cautionary instructions should instruct the jury to scruti-
nize the informant's testimony closely for the purpose of determining
whether it tends to place guilt upon a defendant in furtherance of the
informer's own interest by noting the different sources of bias brought
out on cross-examination that would supply such interest.
THOMAS S. BERKAU
'3For example, where the defendant himself is an addict or all his witnesses are addicted to
drugs, a cautionary instruction as to the unreliability of addict informers may prejudice his case.
See Godfrey v. United States, 353 F.2d 456, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"465 F.2d at 573.
mIt should be noted that the mandatory cautionary instruction approach does not provide for
the strategical move which could be used by an experienced criminal attorney, having knowledge
of his defendant's rights, of deliberately failing to request a cautionary instruction after realizing
the trial judge has forgotten to submit the cautionary instruction to him and then upon return of
the verdict arguing for a new trial based on the trial judge's oversight. However, if it could be shown
that the attorney deliberately failed to request the instruction after realizing the trial judge's
oversight, he may be estopped from claiming error on appeal. Proof of knowledge would be
difficult to show but could be inferred from the attorney's background and experience in criminal
law. In addition, the trial judge's oversight might not be reversible error on appeal due to substan-
tial corroboration of the informant's testimony.
[Vol. 51
